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and motivation, to more dorsal frontostriatal circuits, associated 
with cognition and action (Alexander et al., 1986; Haber and 
Knutson, 2010; Figure 1).
Although the widely distributed and diffuse nature of its projec-
tion system to large parts of the forebrain concurs with an account 
of dopamine in relatively non-specific terms, such as serving activa-
tion or energization, it is also clear that dopamine does not simply 
amplify (or suppress) all forebrain activity in a functionally non-
specific manner. Indeed extensive evidence indicates that effects of 
dopamine depend on specific task demands and their underlying 
neural systems (Robbins, 2000; Cools et al., 2001a; Frank et al., 
2004). In line with these insights, we suggest here that changes in 
appetitive motivation, which may result from changes in neuro-
chemical activity, for example, due to stress, fatigue, or neuropsy-
chiatric abnormality, also have functionally selective consequences 
for cognition.
More specifically, we put forward the working hypothesis 
that appetitive motivation might promote selectively our abil-
ity to switch between different tasks, providing us with some of 
the cognitive flexibility that is required in our constantly chang-
ing environment. Conversely, we speculate, based on preliminary 
data, that dopamine-mediated appetitive motivation might also 
have detrimental consequences for cognition, e.g., by impairing 
cognitive focusing and increasing distractibility. The implication 
of this speculation is that dopamine-mediated appetitive motiva-
tion might potentiate flexible behavior, albeit not by potentiating 
the impact of current goals on behavior. This speculation stems 
partly from the recognition that the motivational forces that drive 
behavior are not always under goal-direct control and can be mala-
daptive (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002). Moreover dopamine is 
well known to play an important role in mediating the detrimental 
(i.e., non-goal-directed) consequences of reward (Berridge, 2007; 
Robbins and Everitt, 2007).
IntroductIon
The ability to control our behavior requires our actions to be goal-
directed, and our goals to be organized hierarchically. Goals can 
be defined at different levels: motivational goals (e.g., rewards), 
cognitive goals (e.g., task-sets), and action goals (e.g., stimulus–
response mappings). Thus, goal-directed behavior requires, among 
other things, the transformation of information about reward into 
abstract cognitive decisions, which in turn need to be translated 
into specific actions. The mechanisms underlying this hierarchy of 
goal-directed control are not well understood.
This paper focuses on the degree to which such goal-directed 
behavior is controlled by incentive motivation. We have restricted 
our discussion to the effects of appetitive motivation, while taking 
note of the wealth of evidence indicating that stimuli that acti-
vate the appetitive motivational system have an inhibitory influ-
ence on behavior that is controlled by the aversive motivational 
system (Konorsky, 1967; Dickinson and Balleine, 2002). Unlike 
aversive motivation, appetitive motivation refers to the state trig-
gered by external stimuli that have rewarding properties and has 
been argued to have a general potentiating or enhancing effect on 
behavior and cognition (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002; Robbins 
and Everitt, 2003; Krawczyk et al., 2007; Pessoa, 2009; Jimura 
et al., 2010; Pessoa and Engelmann, 2010; Savine and Braver, 
2010). Its effects on behavior and cognition have been associ-
ated with changes in neurochemical activity, such as increases 
in dopamine signaling in the striatum (Lyon and Robbins, 1975; 
Ikemoto and Panksepp, 1999; Robbins and Everitt, 2003; Berridge, 
2007). This observation is generally in keeping with proposals 
that dopamine plays an important role in reward-related effort 
(Salamone et al., 2007) and generalized activation/energization 
of behavior (Robbins and Everitt, 2007). It is also consistent with 
data suggesting that dopamine might direct information flow 
from ventromedial frontostriatal circuits, implicated in reward 
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Our working hypothesis is grounded in (albeit preliminary) 
empirical evidence indicating opposite effects of both dopamin-
ergic and motivational/affective state manipulations on cogni-
tive flexibility and cognitive focusing, which have been argued to 
reflect distinct striatal and prefrontal brain regions respectively 
(Crofts et al., 2001; Bilder et al., 2004; Dreisbach and Goschke, 
2004; Dreisbach, 2006; Hazy et al., 2006; Cools et al., 2007; Rowe 
et al., 2007; van Steenbergen et al., 2009; Cools and D’Esposito, 
2011). Indeed current models highlight a role for dopamine, par-
ticularly in the striatum, in the flexible updating of current task-
representations (Hazy et al., 2006; Maia and Frank, 2011). The 
finding that appetitive motivation is associated with robust changes 
in dopamine levels particularly in the striatum, thus concurs with 
our hypothesis that appetitive motivation potentiates (at least some 
forms of) cognitive flexibility, perhaps even at the expense of cog-
nitive focusing. Such a bias toward cognitive flexibility should be 
generally adaptive, given that motivational goals in the real world 
are not often readily available, thus requiring preparatory behavior 
that is flexible rather than focused (Baldo and Kelley, 2007).
Together these observations suggest that appetitive motivation 
acts to enhance cognition in a manner that is functionally specific, 
varying as a function of task demands, and that these functionally 
specific effects are mediated by dopamine. Clearly, as in the case 
of dopamine (Cools and Robbins, 2004; Cools et al., 2009), effects 
of appetitive motivation will vary not only as a function of task 
demands, but also as a function of the baseline state of the system. 
Thus both motivational and neurochemical state changes will have 
rather different effects in individuals with low and high baseline 
levels of motivation, consistent with the existence of multiple Yerkes 
Dodson “inverted U shaped” functions (Yerkes and Dodson, 1908; 
Cools and Robbins, 2004).
Let us briefly discuss the role of striatal dopamine in the two 
separate domains of motivation and cognitive control before 
addressing its role in their interaction.
dopamIne and appetItIve motIvatIon
The ventromedial striatum (VMS, including the nucleus accum-
bens) is highly innervated by mesolimbic dopaminergic neurons 
and is well known to be implicated in reward and motivation 
(Robbins and Everitt, 1992; Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Ikemoto 
and Panksepp, 1999; Schultz, 2002; Knutson and Cooper, 2005; 
Baldo and Kelley, 2007). Thus dopamine manipulations in the 
VMS affect performance on multiple paradigms thought to 
measure motivated behavior, including conditioned reinforce-
ment, Pavlovian-instrumental transfer paradigms, effort-based 
decision making tasks, and progressive ratio schedules (Taylor 
and Robbins, 1984; Dickinson et al., 2000; Wyvell and Berridge, 
2000, 2001; Parkinson et al., 2002). These experiments primarily 
reveal effects of dopamine on so-called preparatory conditioned 
responses, which are thought to reflect activation of a motivational 
system (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002), while leaving unaffected, 
or if anything, having the opposite effect on the more stereotypic 
patterns of consummatory responding (Robbins and Everitt, 1992; 
Baldo and Kelley, 2007). Thus administration of the indirect cat-
echolamine enhancer amphetamine in the VMS of hungry rats 
potentiated locomotor excitement in the presence of food and 
increased lever pressing in response to, or in anticipation of a 
reward-predictive cue, while decreasing or leaving unaffected food 
intake as well as appetitive hedonic responses like taste reactivity 
(Taylor and Robbins, 1984; Bakshi and Kelley, 1991; Pecina et al., 
1997; Wyvell and Berridge, 2000, 2001). Conversely, dopamine 
receptor blockade or dopamine lesions in the VMS reduced loco-
motor activity and cue-evoked incentive motivation for reward 
(Dickinson et al., 2000; Parkinson et al., 2002), while again leaving 
unaffected or even increasing food intake (Koob et al., 1978). These 
animal studies emphasize the importance of VMS dopamine in 
appetitive motivation and suggest that the hedonic or consumma-
tory aspects of reward are likely mediated by a different, possible 
antagonistic system (Floresco et al., 1996; Robbins and Everitt, 
1996, 2003; Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Ikemoto and Panksepp, 
1999; Baldo and Kelley, 2007; Berridge, 2007; Phillips et al., 2007; 
Salamone et al., 2007; for similar suggestions in humans, see Aarts 
et al., 2010).
At first sight, this well-established observation provides appar-
ently clear grounds for assuming that dopamine contributes to 
optimal reward- or goal-directed behavior. However, psychologists 
have also long recognized that there are multiple distinct compo-
nents to the motivation of behavior (Konorsky, 1967; Dickinson 
and Balleine, 2002). Thus instrumental behavior is motivated not 
only by the goals that we set ourselves, but also by generalized drives 
and/or so-called Pavlovian “wanting,” the latter two processes not 
necessarily always contributing to adaptive, optimized behavior. 
To clarify this point, it may help to consider the operational defi-
nition that psychologists have invoked for distinguishing instru-
mental behavior that is goal-directed from instrumental behavior 
that is not goal-directed, i.e., habitual (Dickinson and Balleine, 
2002). Following this tradition, behavior is goal-directed only if 
it accords to two criteria; first, it has to be driven by knowledge 
about the contingency between the action and the outcome (as 
measured with contingency degradation tests); second, it has to 
be sensitive to changes in the value of the goal (as measured with 
outcome devaluation tests, involving for example selective satiety). 
Using these operational definitions, Dickinson and Balleine (2002) 
have established that Pavlovian conditioned stimuli that induce 
so-called “wanting” can modify instrumental behavior without 
accessing action–outcome representations, that is, in a manner 
that is not goal-directed. This is illustrated most clearly by the 
role of reward-predictive stimuli in compulsive craving for drugs of 
abuse or other targets of addiction, which of course almost always 
implicates dopamine dysfunction (Berridge and Robinson, 1998; 
Everitt and Robbins, 2005; Volkow et al., 2009). In keeping with 
this observation are suggestions that motivational influences on 
instrumental behavior by Pavlovian stimulus reinforcer contingen-
cies might reflect modulation of well-established habits rather than 
of goal-directed behavior (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002). Data 
showing that dopamine D1/D2 receptor antagonists attenuated 
Pavlovian-instrumental transfer without affecting instrumen-
tal incentive learning (Dickinson et al., 2000) indeed suggested 
that dopamine might act through Pavlovian processes rather than 
through modifying action–outcome representations (Dickinson 
and Balleine, 2002).
In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that the effects of 
appetitive motivation on cognition that are mediated by dopa-
mine are functionally specific, leading to cognitive improvement 
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paradigm demonstrating that effects of dopamine D1/D2 receptor 
agonist administration to healthy young volunteers on flexibility 
(task-switching) and focusing (distractor–resistance) were accom-
panied by drug effects on the striatum and the PFC respectively 
(Cools et al., 2007).
In sum, dopamine’s effects on cognition are known to be func-
tionally specific rather than global, with opposite effects on cogni-
tive flexibility and cognitive focusing. These opposite effects have 
been proposed to reflect modulation of distinct brain regions, with 
dopamine in the striatum playing a prominent role in a form of 
flexibility that involves shifting to well-established, i.e., “habitized” 
stimulus–response sets.
dopamIne and the motIvatIon–cognItIon 
InteractIon
So far we have seen that striatal dopamine’s effect on motivated 
behavior is most prominent in terms of its preparatory component 
and that such preparatory effects can be maladaptive. This observa-
tion that dopamine’s effect on motivation might have maladaptive 
consequences for behavior concurs with observations that effects 
of dopamine in the cognitive domain depend on task demands 
and associated neural systems, so that dopaminergic drugs can 
have detrimental as well as beneficial consequences for cognition. 
Together these insights have led to the speculation that incentive 
motivation might act to enhance cognitive performance by poten-
tiating dopamine in the striatum in a manner that is functionally 
specific, i.e., restricted to a form of cognitive flexibility that involves 
shifting to well-established habits, and not extending to, or even at 
the expense of cognitive focusing. Below we review empirical evi-
dence that address the different aspects of this working hypothesis.
evIdence from neuroanatomIcal studIes
Motivation–cognition interactions have long been proposed to 
reflect dopamine-dependent interfacing between different paral-
lel frontostriatal circuits associated with motivation and cognition 
(Figure 1). For example, neuroanatomical studies in rats from the 
1970s have suggested that activity in the dorsal striatum is modu-
lated by activity in the ventral striatum via the dopaminergic cells 
in the substantia nigra (Nauta et al., 1978). Tracer experiments 
in non-human primates have revived this notion by revealing an 
arrangement of spiraling striato-nigro-striatal (SNS) connections 
between the dopaminergic cells in the midbrain and striatal regions 
that were defined on the basis of their frontal cortical input (Haber 
et al., 2000; Haber, 2003). Similar connections have been found in 
rodents (Ikemoto, 2007). The SNS connections are thought to direct 
information flow in a feed-forward manner via stepwise disinhi-
bition of the ascending dopaminergic projections from the VMS 
(including the nucleus accumbens), via the dorsomedial striatum 
(DMS, caudate nucleus), to the dorsolateral striatum (DLS, puta-
men). The resulting information flow from ventromedial to dorso-
lateral striatal regions provides a hierarchical (or heterarchical, see 
Haruno and Kawato, 2006) mechanism by which motivational goals 
can influence cognitive and subsequent motor control processes. 
Indeed, the VMS has long been hypothesized to provide the basis 
for the interface between motivation and action on the basis of its 
major inputs from limbic areas like the amygdala, hippocampus and 
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and output to the motor areas 
or  cognitive impairment depending on the specific task demands 
under study. An important implication of this observation is that 
effects of dopamine on interactions between motivation and cog-
nitive control that appear to be mediated by a modification of 
motivational influences on cognitively mediated, goal-directed 
behavior may in fact reflect modification of motivational influ-
ences on habitual behavior.
dopamIne and cognItIon
Accumulating evidence in the domain of cognition indicates 
that manipulations of dopamine can have contrasting effects as 
a function of task demands. For example, opposite effects have 
been observed in terms of cognitive flexibility and cognitive 
focusing (Crofts et al., 2001; Bilder et al., 2004; Cools et al., 2007; 
Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008; Durstewitz et al., 2010; Cools and 
D’Esposito, 2011). Mehta et al. (2004) have shown that dopamine 
D2 receptor blockade after acute administration of the antagonist 
sulpiride impaired cognitive flexibility (measured in terms of task-
switching), but improved cognitive focusing (measured in terms 
of delayed response performance with task-irrelevant distractors). 
Similar contrasting effects on cognitive flexibility and focusing have 
been reported after dopamine lesions in non-human primates 
(Roberts et al., 1994; Collins et al., 2000; Crofts et al., 2001), after 
dopaminergic medication withdrawal in patients with Parkinson’s 
disease (PD; Cools et al., 2001a, 2003, 2010a) and as a function of 
genetic variation in human dopamine genes (Bilder et al., 2004; 
Colzato et al., 2010). Evidence from functional neuroimaging and 
computational modeling work has suggested that these opposite 
effects might reflect modulation of distinct brain regions, with the 
striatum mediating effects on at least some forms of cognitive flexi-
bility, but the prefrontal cortex (PFC) mediating effects on cognitive 
focusing (Hazy et al., 2006; Cools et al., 2007; Cools and D’Esposito, 
2011). This hypothesis likely reflects an oversimplified view of 
dopamine’s complex effects on cognition, with different forms of 
cognitive flexibility implicating distinct neural and neurochemical 
systems (Robbins and Arnsten, 2009; Kehagia et al., 2010; Floresco 
and Jentsch, 2011). In particular, the striatum seems implicated 
predominantly in a form of cognitive flexibility that involves shift-
ing to well-established (“habitized”) stimulus–response sets, that 
does not require new learning or working memory. For example 
6-OHDA lesions in the striatum of marmosets impaired set-shifting 
to an already established set, but left unaffected set-shifting to a 
new, to-be-learned set (Collins et al., 2000). This finding paralleled 
the beneficial effects of dopaminergic medication in PD, which 
implicates primarily the striatum. These effects were restricted to 
task-set switching between well-established sets, and did not extend 
to set shifting to new, to-be-learned sets (Cools et al., 2001b; Lewis 
et al., 2005; Slabosz et al., 2006). The PFC might well be implicated 
in higher-order forms of set shifting that do involve new learning 
and/or working memory (Monchi et al., 2004; Floresco and Magyar, 
2006; Cools et al., 2010b; Kehagia et al., 2010). Interestingly, the 
beneficial effects of dopaminergic medication in PD on this striatal 
form of well-established, habit-like task-set switching were accom-
panied by detrimental effects on cognitive focusing, as measured in 
terms of distractor–resistance during the performance of a delayed 
response task (Cools et al., 2010a). These findings paralleled phar-
macological neuroimaging work with the same delayed response 
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 sensitivity of neuronal firing in the DMS as well as midbrain dopa-
mine neurons to appetitive motivation. In this task, one of four 
directions was randomly assigned as the target location by a cue 
that also signaled the anticipation of reward. Subsequently, the 
monkey had to make a saccade to the remembered location. It was 
found that cues that predicted reward resulted in earlier and faster 
saccades relative to cues that predicted no reward. Firing patterns in 
caudate nucleus (DMS) neurons correlated with the change in sac-
cade behavior, changing their preferred direction to the rewarded 
direction (Kawagoe et al., 1998). In a follow-up study, the authors 
observed that reward-predictive cues resulted in increased firing 
of dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain, as well as in neurons of 
the caudate nucleus (DMS; Kawagoe et al., 2004). Together, these 
findings demonstrate that effects of reward anticipation on DMS 
activity and associated motor-planning behavior were accompanied 
by changes in dopamine activity.
In humans, a role for dopamine in the effects of motivation on 
cognition has so far been addressed only in the domain of long-term 
memory associated with the hippocampus (Wittmann et al., 2005; 
Adcock et al., 2006; Schott et al., 2006; for a review, see Shohamy 
and Adcock, 2010). This relatively young field suggests that dopa-
mine may well play a role in the long-term plasticity-enhancing 
effects of motivation. In the next section, we address studies that 
focus on dopamine-dependent effects of motivation on shorter 
term plasticity, involving the striatum.
evIdence from human studIes: motIvatIon and cognItIve 
flexIbIlIty
Data from two recent studies support the hypothesis that dopa-
mine is critical for interactions between motivation and cognition. 
Specifically, these studies highlight an important role for dopamine 
in the modification by appetitive motivation of switching between 
well-established habits. The set-shifting paradigm involved cued 
task-switching between well-learnt task-sets, minimizing learn-
ing and working memory processes (Rogers and Monsell, 1995). 
Subjects switched between responding according to the direction 
of the arrow (task A) and responding according to the direction 
indicated by the word (task B) of a series of arrow-word targets 
(consisting of the words “left” or “right” in a left or right pointing 
arrow; Figure 2A). Repetitions or switches of task-set were pseudo-
randomly preceded by high or low reward cues. In the first study, 
young healthy adults performed the task in the magnetic resonance 
scanner and both behavioral and neural responses were assessed as 
a function of inter-individual variability in dopamine genes (Aarts 
et al., 2010). In particular, we focused on a common variable num-
ber of tandem repeats (VNTR) polymorphism in the dopamine 
transporter gene (DAT1), expressed predominantly in the striatum. 
Relative to the 10R homozygotes, the 9R carriers – with presumably 
increased striatal dopamine levels – exhibited significant reward 
benefits in terms of overall performance and increased reward-
related BOLD responses in VMS. However, most critically, they also 
demonstrated significant reward benefits in terms of task-switching 
(i.e., reduced switch costs in the high versus low reward condition). 
This effect was accompanied by a potentiation of switch-related 
BOLD responses in DMS (caudate nucleus) in the high reward 
versus the low reward condition (Figures 2B,C). Importantly, the 
reward-related activity in VMS correlated  positively with the effects 
via the globus pallidus (Mogenson et al., 1980; Groenewegen et al., 
1996). However, rather than a direct limbic-motor connection, the 
SNS connections provide a more physiologically and psychologi-
cally plausible mechanism by which motivational goals exert their 
influence on action (Haber et al., 2000).
evIdence from psychopharmacologIcal studIes In anImals
Rodent research on drug addiction has provided evidence for the 
functional importance of dopamine-mediated interactions between 
ventral and dorsal parts of the striatum. For example, Belin and 
Everitt (2008) have adopted an intrastriatal disconnection proce-
dure in rats to investigate the necessity of the SNS connections in 
the transition of reward-directed drug-seeking behavior to habitual 
behavior associated with the DLS. The authors lesioned the VMS 
selectively on one side of the rat brain and, concomitantly, blocked 
dopaminergic input from the substantia nigra in the DLS with a 
receptor antagonist on the contralateral side of the brain. Thus, 
they functionally disconnected the VMS and DLS on both sides of 
the brain, while leaving unilateral VMS and DLS on opposite sites 
intact. This functional disconnection between VMS and DLS greatly 
reduced the transition of VMS-associated to DLS-associated habit-
ual behavior, whereas the unilateral manipulations were ineffective 
in isolation (Belin and Everitt, 2008). These data show the functional 
importance of the spiraling SNS connections in VMS control over 
dorsal striatal functioning in addiction (Belin et al., 2009).
Functional evidence for a role of dopamine in interactions 
between motivation and DMS-associated functions has also been 
established in non-human primates. For example, neurophysio-
logical recordings by Hikosaka and colleagues during the perfor-
mance of a memory-guided saccadic eye-movement task revealed 
Figure 1 | Ventromedial to dorsolateral direction of information flow 
through frontostriatal-nigral circuitry. Interactions between the different 
frontostriatal loops involved in motivational control (red), cognitive control 
(yellow), and motor control (blue) can take place at the level of the SNS 
connections (bend arrows) or at the level of the frontostriatal connections 
(straight arrows). The direction of information flow is always from ventromedial 
to dorsolateral regions in the frontostriatal circuitry. SNS, striato-nigral-striatal; 
N. Acc, nucleus accumbens (ventromedial striatum); Caud, caudate nucleus 
(dorsomedial striatum); Put, putamen (dorsolateral striatum); OFC, 
orbitofrontal cortex; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; DLPFC, dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex; PMC, premotor cortex.
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with the degree of dopamine depletion in different striatal sub-
regions as measured with 123I-FP-CIT single photon emission com-
puted tomography (SPECT). First, we replicated previous studies 
by demonstrating a switch deficit in PD relative to healthy controls. 
Interestingly, this deficit was restricted to certain conditions of the 
task, revealing a disproportionate difficulty with switching to the 
best established, most dominant “arrow” task. Additionally, the 
SPECT measurements showed that this switch deficit in PD was 
associated with dopamine cell loss in the most affected striatal 
sub-region (posterior putamen, Figure 2E), thus demonstrating 
the involvement of striatal dopamine in this particular “habit-like” 
of reward on subsequent switch-related activity during the targets 
in DMS, with high dopamine subjects demonstrating high activ-
ity in both striatal regions (Figure 2D; Aarts et al., 2010). These 
dopamine-mediated motivation–cognition interaction effects 
were recently replicated in an independent dataset (van Holstein 
et al., 2011) and strengthened our working hypothesis that striatal 
dopamine mediates motivational modification of certain cognitive 
functions in humans.
In a second study, we investigated the effect of appetitive moti-
vation on cognitive flexibility in patients with PD using the same 
paradigm (Figure 2A). Effects within the PD group were  associated 
Figure 2 | experimental evidence for the beneficial effect of motivation on 
cognitive flexibility in humans. (A) The rewarded set-shifting paradigm used in 
our studies to investigate the motivation–cognition interface. (B) In our genetic 
imaging study (Aarts et al., 2010), participants with genetically determined high 
striatal dopamine levels benefited more from reward anticipation in terms of 
set-shifting than participants with low dopamine levels. (C) In our genetic 
imaging study (Aarts et al., 2010), reward cues elicited activity in VMS (in red), 
whereas the dopamine-dependent effect of reward prediction on set shifting 
was observed in DMS (in yellow). (D) Activity in these striatal sub-regions [see 
(C)] was positively correlated, with high striatal dopamine subjects showing high 
activity in both VMS and DMS during reward anticipation and rewarded 
set-shifting respectively. (e) In our SPECT study in Parkinson’s disease (Aarts 
et al., under review), patients showed the most marked dopamine depletion in 
dorsolateral striatum (posterior putamen), whereas ventromedial striatum (n. 
accumbens) was least affected. (F) Patients with the greatest dopamine 
depletion (i.e., least dopamine cell integrity) showed the greatest effects of 
anticipated reward in reducing the switch cost in the dominant arrow task 
[(switch-repeat)low − (switch-repeat)high]; presumably by increased reward-
induced dopamine release in the relatively intact neurons in ventromedial 
striatum.
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type of cognitive flexibility. More critically, our results demon-
strated compensatory capacity of reward-predictive signals to facil-
itate cognitive flexibility in mild PD. Specifically, when anticipating 
reward, patients were able to reduce the switch cost in the domi-
nant arrow task to such an extent that the switch cost no longer 
differed from that of controls on high reward trials. Interestingly, 
the use of reward was also highly correlated with the amount 
of dopamine depletion in the most affected striatal sub-region 
(Aarts et al., under review). Patients with greater dopamine cell 
loss made more use of anticipated reward for reducing the switch 
cost than did patients with less dopamine cell loss (Figure 2F). 
Further exploration of this finding demonstrated that this effect 
of motivation on task-switching was driven by two opponent pro-
cesses: first, patients with more dopamine depletion made more 
errors on repeat trials under high than under low reward. This 
detrimental effect of reward on repeat trials could reflect a form 
of impulsivity, where the current task representation is rendered 
unstable by reward, leading to reduced cognitive “perseverance” 
or maintenance (see also Hazy et al., 2006). Controls did not show 
such detrimental impulsive behavior on repeat trials under high 
reward. Second, patients with more dopamine depletion made 
fewer errors on switch trials under high than under low reward. 
Thus, anticipated reward proved beneficial for switching to the 
other task-set, which profits from reduced cognitive perseverance. 
This effect of reward on switch trials in patients did not differ 
from that of controls. The beneficial effects of anticipated reward 
on task-switching in the young healthy adults mentioned above 
(Aarts et al., 2010) was driven by a beneficial effect of reward on 
switch trials only, instead of opposite effects of reward on repeat 
and switch trials. In sum, PD patients differed from controls in 
showing detrimental effects of reward on repeat trials, which were 
greatest in patients with most dopamine cell loss in the striatum 
(Aarts et al., under review). This result fits with previous findings 
that a low baseline dopamine state contributes to trait impulsiv-
ity and addictive behavior (Cools et al., 2007; Dalley et al., 2007); 
presumably due to reduced auto-regulatory mechanisms, resulting 
in increased dopamine release (Buckholtz et al., 2010). Hence, 
we speculate that reward-induced impulsivity in our PD group 
was caused by increased reward-related dopamine release in the 
relatively intact dopamine cells projecting to the ventral striatum 
(Figure 2E). In line with this view are the findings of increased 
dopamine release in ventral striatum in PD patients diagnosed 
with impulsive–compulsive behavior relative to those without 
(Evans et al., 2006; Steeves et al., 2009; O’Sullivan et al., 2011). 
Our PD data are also in accordance with the working hypothesis 
that striatal dopamine mediates motivational effects on cognition 
depending on task demands.
evIdence from human studIes: functIonally specIfIc effects 
of motIvatIon
Motivation has been shown to improve attentional processes in 
many perceptual and cognitive control domains (for reviews, see 
Pessoa, 2009; Pessoa and Engelmann, 2010). Data from a number of 
human imaging studies have suggested that motivation might have 
non-specific enhancing effects on cognitive processing. For exam-
ple, in a functional neuroimaging study, motivational incentives 
increased PFC activity and connectivity during cognitive control 
tasks, in a manner that seemed to depend on the cognitive effort 
(i.e., cost–benefit ratio) rather than on the specific qualitative cog-
nitive demand of the tasks (Kouneiher et al., 2009). Based on these 
data the authors argued that motivation and cognitive control can 
be regarded as two separate, additive instead of interactive factors 
of executive functioning (Kouneiher et al., 2009). However, such 
an additive view of motivation and cognition contrasts with the 
conclusion drawn by a different set of recent studies which ena-
bled the disentangling of different cognitive control components. 
These studies have found that effects of appetitive motivation and 
affect may well depend on the type of cognitive processing at hand 
(Dreisbach and Goschke, 2004; Dreisbach, 2006; Rowe et al., 2007), 
consistent with our working hypothesis. Before turning to these 
studies, we will discuss preliminary data from our own lab.
So far we have seen that appetitive motivation can potentiate cer-
tain forms of task-switching to well-established stimulus–response 
mappings in a dopamine-dependent manner. The observation 
that these effects were driven by detrimental effects of anticipated 
reward on repeat trials and beneficial effects on switch trials in 
the PD group (Aarts et al., submitted) already indicates a level 
of functional specificity. To test more directly the hypothesis that 
these beneficial effects of appetitive motivation on some cognitive 
functions might come at the expense of impairments on other 
cognitive functions, we designed a Stroop-like conflict task with 
high and low reward conditions. This task resembled the previously 
used task-switching paradigm in many ways except that it required 
cognitive focusing instead of cognitive switching. Seventeen par-
ticipants performed this Stroop-like task by responding with a left 
or right button press to the words “left” or “right” in a left or right 
pointing arrow (Figure 3A). The direction denoted by the word was 
either congruent or incongruent with the direction indicated by 
the arrow. Similar to the task-switching paradigm discussed above 
(Aarts et al., under review), all trials began with a cue predicting 
high or low reward for correct performance. Critically, following 
the reward cues, we explicitly informed participants about the 
(in)congruency of the upcoming Stroop target (see Aarts et al., 
2008). In half of the trials, participants were informed about this 
congruency by informative cues (Figure 3A). In the other half of 
the trials, the targets were preceded by cues that gave no infor-
mation about the upcoming congruency. The idea here was that 
incongruency-predictive cues (relative to non-informative cues) 
would encourage participants to reduce their attentional focus, 
whereas the congruency-predictive cues would encourage partici-
pants to widen their attentional focus. In other words, cues that 
signaled upcoming incongruent targets would encourage partici-
pants to proactively focus on the task-relevant word, preventing 
distraction by the task-irrelevant arrow, whereas cues that signal 
upcoming congruent words encouraged participants to proactively 
widen attention in order to comprise both the task-relevant word 
as well as the task-irrelevant arrow (see Aarts and Roelofs, 2010). 
The combination of reward and information cues enabled us to 
determine the effects of appetitive motivation on the cognitive 
focusing of attention.
Consistent with our previous results (Aarts et al., 2008) we 
showed that (irrespective of reward condition) participants 
responded faster and made less errors when informative cues pre-
ceded the congruent and incongruent targets relative to  uninformed 
Aarts et al. Dopamine and the motivation–cognition interface
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changed (Dreisbach, 2006; van Wouwe et al., 2011), but, within 
the same task, positive affect decreased the ability to maintain 
the goal when nothing changed (Dreisbach, 2006). Functionally 
specific effects of positive affect have also been demonstrated in 
conflict paradigms, like the Eriksen flanker task. Some authors have 
shown that positive affect increased attention toward the distracting 
flanker arrows, thus, increasing “the breadth of attentional selec-
tion” (Rowe et al., 2007); others have found that positive affect 
reduced the ability to focus on the target arrow after experienced 
conflict (van Steenbergen et al., 2010). Our preliminary results 
from the rewarded Stroop conflict paradigm extend these effects of 
positive affect in the flanker conflict task, by revealing contrasting 
effects of appetitive motivation on the widening and focusing of 
attention within the same task and within the same participants. 
In sum, both appetitive motivation and positive affect enhance 
certain forms of cognitive flexibility at the expense of cognitive 
focusing. According to our working hypothesis, these effects might 
reflect dopamine-dependent flow of information processing related 
to Pavlovian incentives from ventromedial parts of the striatum 
to more dorsal regions in the striatum, associated with habit-like 
information processing.
It might be noted here again that multiple mechanisms have 
been proposed to underlie the motivational control of behavior 
(Dickinson and Balleine, 2002). We have highlighted that some 
motivational influences can be maladaptive, and these might 
implicate dopamine. However, there is also evidence for motiva-
tional influences on goal-direct behavior, that is, those mediated 
by instrumental incentive learning and acquisition of action–
outcome representations (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002). These 
alternate mechanisms might account for findings that at first 
sight seem incompatible with the current working hypothesis. 
Specifically, appetitive motivation has been shown to increase 
spatial orienting to a target location in the face of distractors 
(Engelmann and Pessoa, 2007; Engelmann et al., 2009), or to 
reduce conflict by biasing visual selection (Padmala and Pessoa, 
2011). Furthermore, in young and old adults as well as in medi-
cated patients with PD, motivation increased anti-saccade perfor-
mance, encompassing incompatible stimulus–response mappings 
like in Stroop and flanker paradigms (Harsay et al., 2010). The 
critical question is whether these effects are also dependent on 
striatal dopamine, or whether they implicate modulation by dif-
ferent neurochemical systems. Addressing this question requires 
controlled dopaminergic medication withdrawal and/or phar-
macological manipulation approaches.
frontal control of dopamIne-dependent strIatal 
processIng
The striatum does not act alone and requires interactions with 
specific frontal regions to operate effectively (Alexander et al., 1986; 
Passingham, 1993; Figure 1). Recent neuroimaging work in humans 
and monkeys has revealed that effects of appetitive motivation on 
cognitive control are accompanied by modulation of responses 
in the PFC (Ichihara-Takeda and Funahashi, 2008; Kouneiher 
et al., 2009; Beck et al., 2010; Ichihara-Takeda et al., 2010; Jimura 
et al., 2010; Savine and Braver, 2010; Wallis and Kennerley, 2010). 
For example, functional interactions between the medial and the 
lateral PFC have been shown to accompany effects of  appetitive 
targets (M. van Holstein, E. Aarts, R. Cools, unpublished observa-
tions). Importantly, as predicted, appetitive motivation significantly 
altered the information benefit depending on the congruency of 
the targets. That is, proactive widening of attention (uninformed–
informed congruent targets) benefited from anticipated reward 
(15 versus 1 cent), whereas proactive focusing of attention (unin-
formed–informed incongruent targets) was hampered by antici-
pated reward (Figure 3B). Intriguingly, these data show that, 
depending on the task at hand, appetitive motivation can have 
both beneficial as well as detrimental effects on cognitive function.
Similar findings have been obtained when studying the effects 
of positive affect on cognitive control. Thus, positive affect has 
been shown to increase cognitive flexibility (i.e., decreasing per-
severation), while increasing distractibility (i.e., decreasing cogni-
tive stability) on different types of trials in a set-shifting paradigm 
(Dreisbach and Goschke, 2004). Opposite effects have also been 
observed in an AX continuous performance task: positive affect 
increased cognitive flexibility when a maintained goal unexpectedly 
Figure 3 | incentive motivation might have detrimental effects on 
cognitive focusing. (A) The rewarded Stroop paradigm, including a reward 
cue (1 or 15 cent), an information cue about the upcoming target congruency 
[informative: incongruent (this example) or congruent (green circle); or 
uninformative (gray question mark)], and an arrow-word Stroop target. The 
task was to respond to the direction indicated by the word. (B) Reward 
anticipation had opposite effects on widening and focusing of attention as 
measured with the information benefit (uninformed–informed) on congruent 
and incongruent targets respectively; with high anticipated reward particularly 
impairing proactive focusing on the incongruent trials (M. van Holstein, 
E. Aarts, R. Cools, unpublished observations).
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error likelihood. J. Neurosci. 28, 
4671–4678.
Adcock, R. A., Thangavel, A., Whitfield-
Gabrieli, S., Knutson, B., and Gabrieli, 
J. D. (2006). Reward-motivated learn-
ing: mesolimbic activation precedes 
imaging. Neuropsychopharmacology 
35, 1943–1951.
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can be independent of conflict and 
Aarts, E., Roelofs, A., Franke, B., Rijpkema, 
M., Fernandez, G., Helmich, R. C., 
and Cools, R. (2010). Striatal dopa-
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motivational and cognitive control 
in humans: evidence from genetic 
references
Aarts, E., and Roelofs, A. (2010). 
Attentional control in anterior 
cingulate cortex based on probabil-
istic cueing. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 23, 
716–727.
An important implication of this observation is that effects of 
dopamine on interactions between motivation and cognition that 
appear to be mediated by a modification of motivational influences 
on cognitively mediated, goal-directed behavior, like task-switch-
ing, may in fact reflect modification of motivation influences on 
habitual behavior. Findings that the dopamine-dependent effects 
of motivation on task-switching are strongest when participants 
are required to switch to well-established stimulus–response map-
pings are in line with this hypothesis, which requires testing in 
future work.
A further issue to be addressed in future research is the degree to 
which the contrasting effects of motivation on habit-like switching 
and on proactive focusing can be understood in terms of competi-
tion between a striatal system controlling habit-like processing and 
a prefrontal system controlling goal-directed behavior (Dickinson, 
1985; Daw et al., 2005). Clearly these questions require a careful 
integration of traditional psychological approaches, which lever-
age well-operationalized behavioral definitions of goal-directed 
and habitual behavior, with pharmacological studies of cognitive 
control.
Furthermore, given the proposed opponency between appetitive 
and aversive motivational systems, one might ask what is the effect 
of punishment-predictive stimuli on cognition? This is particularly 
interesting in the context of empirical findings that conditioned 
inhibitors, i.e., stimuli predictive of reward omission do not trigger 
an increase, but rather if anything a decrease in midbrain dopamine 
firing (Tobler et al., 2005). Moreover, there is increasing speculation 
about the involvement of the part-opponent system of serotonin 
(Daw et al., 2002; Dayan and Huys, 2009; Boureau and Dayan, 2011; 
Cools et al., 2011), an area that is wide open for empirical work.
Finally, progress in the understanding of the motivational con-
trol of cognition will depend on the degree to which the balance 
between transient and sustained, e.g., context effects are taken into 
account (e.g., Higgins et al., 1997; Maddox and Markman, 2010; 
Savine et al., 2010). For example, Maddox and Markman (2010) 
propose that performance does not only depend on local incentives 
and task demands (as discussed in the current review), but also 
interacts with global incentives like an overall bonus or punishment 
at the end of a task. Such advances will no doubt benefit from the 
recognition that the impact of transient (phasic) changes in neuro-
transmitter activity depends critically on the tonic neurochemical 
state of the system.
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 motivation on the cognitive control processes involved in set shift-
ing (Kouneiher et al., 2009). Another functional neuroimaging 
study concluded that the lateral PFC incorporates reward value in 
goal-directed control during working memory processes (Jimura 
et al., 2010).
These data concur with the existence of multiple mechanisms 
for the motivational control of behavior, which may interact in 
multiple ways, either competitively or synergistically. For example, 
signals in the PFC might control dopaminergic activity in stri-
atal areas in a top-down manner, thus allowing controlled influ-
ences on value assignment to states or actions (Daw et al., 2005; 
Doll et al., 2009; see Figure 1). Consistent with this hypothesis 
are observations that stimulation of different parts of the fron-
tal cortex (using transcranial magnetic stimulation) alters focal 
dopamine release in strongly connected topographically specific 
parts of the striatum (as measured using [11C]raclopride posi-
tron emission tomography; Strafella et al., 2001, 2003, 2005; Ko 
et al., 2008). The role of the PFC in integrating motivation, cogni-
tion, and action is also highlighted by anatomical tracer studies 
in non-human primates showing that value-sensitive regions in 
ventromedial PFC (i.e., ACC/orbitofrontal cortex) project not only 
to strongly connected regions in VMS, but also diffusely to more 
dorsal regions in the striatum that receive most projections from 
the DLPFC (Haber et al., 2006; Figure 1). Electrophysiological 
work with rodents has revealed that changes in dopamine release 
and receptor stimulation in the striatum can alter such PFC input 
to the striatum (Goto and Grace, 2005). More specifically, changes 
in tonic dopamine release were shown to modulate PFC inputs 
into the VMS – and to influence set-shifting behavior – through 
dopamine D2 receptors (Goto and Grace, 2005). These results 
show that striatal dopamine can modulate motivated behavior 
not only via altering striatal output but also via altering striatal 
input from the PFC.
conclusIon and future dIrectIons
There are multiple mechanisms for the control of behavior and 
cognition by motivation. This paper focuses on the appetitive 
motivational system, while recognizing that opponent influences 
on behavior are likely seen of the aversive motivational system. 
In particular, we have concentrated on those effects of appetitive 
motivation that implicate dopamine. These dopamine-dependent 
effects of motivation likely have both detrimental as well as benefi-
cial consequences for cognition, via altering information flow from 
ventromedial to dorsolateral parts of the striatum. This general 
observation is in line with the observation that motivational influ-
ences on behavior are not necessarily driven by representations of 
the goals of instrumental behavior, but might well reflect Pavlovian 
or habit-like anomalies. This is particularly likely in the case of 
dopamine, which is recognized to play a special role in Pavlovian 
and habit systems.
Aarts et al. Dopamine and the motivation–cognition interface
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition  July 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 163 | 8
ensemble states accompany behavio-
ral transitions during rule learning. 
Neuron 66, 438–448.
Engelmann, J. B., Damaraju, E., Padmala, 
S., and Pessoa, L. (2009). Combined 
effects of attention and motivation on 
visual task performance: transient and 
sustained motivational effects. Front. 
Hum. Neurosci. 3:4. doi: 10.3389/
neuro.09.004.2009
Engelmann, J. B., and Pessoa, L. (2007). 
Motivation sharpens exogenous spa-
tial attention. Emotion 7, 668–674.
Evans, A. H., Pavese, N., Lawrence, A. D., 
Tai, Y. F., Appel, S., Doder, M., Brooks, 
D. J., Lees, A. J., and Piccini, P. (2006). 
Compulsive drug use linked to sensi-
tized ventral striatal dopamine trans-
mission. Ann. Neurol. 59, 852–858.
Everitt, B. J., and Robbins, T. W. (2005). 
Neural systems of reinforcement for 
drug addiction: from actions to hab-
its to compulsion. Nat. Neurosci. 8, 
1481–1489.
Floresco, S. B., and Jentsch, J. D. 
(2011). Pharmacological enhance-
ment of  memory and execu-
tive functioning in laboratory 
animals. Neuropsychopharmacology 
36, 227–250.
Floresco, S. B., and Magyar, O. (2006). 
Mesocortical dopamine modulation 
of executive functions: beyond work-
ing memory. Psychopharmacology 
(Berl.) 188, 567–585.
Floresco, S. B., Seamans, J. K., and Phillips, 
A. G. (1996). A selective role for dopa-
mine in the nucleus accumbens of the 
rat in random foraging but not delayed 
spatial win-shift-based foraging. 
Behav. Brain Res. 80, 161–168.
Frank, M. J., Seeberger, L. C., and O’Reilly, 
R. C. (2004). By carrot or by stick: 
cognitive reinforcement learning in 
parkinsonism. Science 306, 1940–1943.
Goto, Y., and Grace, A. A. (2005). 
Dopaminergic modulation of limbic 
and cortical drive of nucleus accum-
bens in goal-directed behavior. Nat. 
Neurosci. 8, 805–812.
Groenewegen, H. J., Wright, C. I., and 
Beijer, A. V. (1996). The nucleus 
accumbens: gateway for limbic struc-
tures to reach the motor system? Prog. 
Brain Res. 107, 485–511.
Haber, S. N. (2003). The primate basal 
ganglia: parallel and integrative 
networks. J. Chem. Neuroanat. 26, 
317–330.
Haber, S. N., Fudge, J. L., and McFarland, 
N. R. (2000). Striatonigrostriatal path-
ways in primates form an ascending 
spiral from the shell to the dorsolateral 
striatum. J. Neurosci. 20, 2369–2382.
Haber, S. N., Kim, K. S., Mailly, P., and 
Calzavara, R. (2006). Reward-related 
cortical inputs define a large striatal 
region in primates that interface with 
Robbins, T. W., and Roberts, A. C. 
(2001). Differential effects of 6-OHDA 
lesions of the frontal cortex and cau-
date nucleus on the ability to acquire 
an attentional set. Cereb. Cortex 11, 
1015–1026.
Dalley, J. W., Fryer, T. D., Brichard, L., 
Robinson, E. S., Theobald, D. E., Laane, 
K., Pena, Y., Murphy, E. R., Shah, Y., 
Probst, K., Abakumova, I., Aigbirhio, 
F. I., Richards, H. K., Hong, Y., Baron, 
J. C., Everitt, B. J., and Robbins, T. W. 
(2007). Nucleus accumbens D2/3 
receptors predict trait impulsivity 
and cocaine reinforcement. Science 
315, 1267–1270.
Daw, N. D., Kakade, S., and Dayan, 
P. (2002). Opponent interactions 
between serotonin and dopamine. 
Neural Netw. 15, 603–616.
Daw, N. D., Niv, Y., and Dayan, P. (2005). 
Uncertainty-based competition 
between prefrontal and dorsolateral 
striatal systems for behavioral control. 
Nat. Neurosci. 8, 1704–1711.
Dayan, P., and Huys, Q. J. (2009). 
Serotonin in affective control. Annu. 
Rev. Neurosci. 32, 95–126.
Dickinson, A. (1985). Actions and hab-
its: the development of behavioural 
autonomy. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. 
308B, 67–78.
Dickinson, A., and Balleine, B. W. (2002). 
“The role of learning in the operation 
of motivational systems,” in Stevens’ 
Handbook of Experimental Psychology 
Vol. 3: Learning, Motivation and 
Emotion, ed. C. R. Gallistel (New York: 
Wiley), 497–533.
Dickinson, A., Smith, J., and Mirenowicz, 
J. (2000). Dissociation of Pavlovian 
and instrumental incentive learning 
under dopamine antagonists. Behav. 
Neurosci. 114, 468–483.
Doll, B. B., Jacobs, W. J., Sanfey, A. G., 
and Frank, M. J. (2009). Instructional 
control of reinforcement learning: a 
behavioral and neurocomputational 
investigation. Brain Res. 1299, 74–94.
Dreisbach, G. (2006). How positive affect 
modulates cognitive control: the costs 
and benefits of reduced maintenance 
capability. Brain Cogn. 60, 11–19.
Dreisbach, G., and Goschke, T. (2004). 
How positive affect modulates cogni-
tive control: reduced perseveration at 
the cost of increased distractibility. J. 
Exp. Psychol. Learn Mem. Cogn. 30, 
343–353.
Durstewitz, D., and Seamans, J. K. (2008). 
The dual-state theory of prefrontal 
cortex dopamine function with rel-
evance to catechol-O-methyltrans-
ferase genotypes and schizophrenia. 
Biol. Psychiatry 64, 739–749.
Durstewitz, D., Vittoz, N. M., Floresco, S. 
B., and Seamans, J. K. (2010). Abrupt 
transitions between prefrontal neural 
(2000). The effect of dopamine deple-
tion from the caudate nucleus of the 
common marmoset (Callithrix jac-
chus) on tests of prefrontal cognitive 
function. Behav. Neurosci. 114, 3–17.
Colzato, L. S., Waszak, F., Nieuwenhuis, S., 
Posthuma, D., and Hommel, B. (2010). 
The flexible mind is associated with 
the catechol-O-methyltransferase 
(COMT) Val158Met polymorphism: 
evidence for a role of dopamine 
in the control of task-switching. 
Neuropsychologia 48, 2764–2768.
Cools, R., Barker, R. A., Sahakian, B. J., 
and Robbins, T. W. (2001a). Enhanced 
or impaired cognitive function in 
Parkinson’s disease as a function of 
dopaminergic medication and task 
demands. Cereb. Cortex 11, 1136–1143.
Cools, R., Barker, R. A., Sahakian, B. J., and 
Robbins, T. W. (2001b). Mechanisms of 
cognitive set flexibility in Parkinson’s 
disease. Brain 124(Pt 12), 2503–2512.
Cools, R., Barker, R. A., Sahakian, B. J., 
and Robbins, T. W. (2003). L-Dopa 
medication remediates cognitive 
inflexibility, but increases impulsivity 
in patients with Parkinson’s disease. 
Neuropsychologia 41, 1431–1441.
Cools, R., and D’Esposito, M. (2011). 
Inverted-U-shaped dopamine actions 
on human working memory and 
cognitive control. Biol. Psychiatry 69, 
e113–e125.
Cools, R., Frank, M. J., Gibbs, S. E., 
Miyakawa, A., Jagust, W., and 
D’Esposito, M. (2009). Striatal dopa-
mine predicts outcome-specific 
reversal learning and its sensitivity to 
dopaminergic drug administration. J. 
Neurosci. 29, 1538–1543.
Cools, R., Miyakawa, A., Sheridan, M., 
and D’Esposito, M. (2010a). Enhanced 
frontal function in Parkinson’s disease. 
Brain 133(Pt 1), 225–233.
Cools, R., Rogers, R., Barker, R. A., and 
Robbins, T. W. (2010b). Top-down 
attentional control in Parkinson’s 
disease: salient considerations. J. Cogn. 
Neurosci. 22, 848–859.
Cools, R., Nakamura, K., and Daw, N. 
D. (2011). Serotonin and dopa-
mine: unifying affective, activa-
tional, and decision functions. 
Neuropsychopharmacology 36, 98–113.
Cools, R., and Robbins, T. W. (2004). 
Chemistry of the adaptive mind. 
Philos. Transact. A Math. Phys. Eng. 
Sci. 362, 2871–2888.
Cools, R., Sheridan, M., Jacobs, E., and 
D’Esposito, M. (2007). Impulsive 
personality predicts dopamine-
dependent changes in frontostriatal 
activity during component processes 
of working memory. J. Neurosci. 27, 
5506–5514.
Crofts, H. S., Dalley, J. W., Collins, P., 
Van Denderen, J. C., Everitt, B. J., 
memory formation. Neuron 50, 
507–517.
Alexander, G. E., DeLong, M. R., and 
Strick, P. L. (1986). Parallel organiza-
tion of functionally segregated circuits 
linking basal ganglia and cortex. Annu. 
Rev. Neurosci. 9, 357–381.
Bakshi, V. P., and Kelley, A. E. (1991). 
Dopaminergic regulation of feed-
ing behavior: II. Differential effects 
of amphetamine microinfusion into 
three striatal subregions. Psychobiology 
19, 233–242.
Baldo, B. A., and Kelley, A. E. (2007). 
Discrete neurochemical coding of dis-
tinguishable motivational processes: 
insights from nucleus accumbens con-
trol of feeding. Psychopharmacology 
(Berl.) 191, 439–459.
Beck, S. M., Locke, H. S., Savine, A. C., 
Jimura, K., and Braver, T. S. (2010). 
Primary and secondary rewards dif-
ferentially modulate neural activity 
dynamics during working memory. 
PLoS ONE 5, e9251. doi: 10.1371/
journal.pone.0009251
Belin, D., and Everitt, B. J. (2008). Cocaine 
seeking habits depend upon dopa-
mine-dependent serial connectivity 
linking the ventral with the dorsal 
striatum. Neuron 57, 432–441.
Belin, D., Jonkman, S., Dickinson, A., 
Robbins, T. W., and Everitt, B. J. 
(2009). Parallel and interactive learn-
ing processes within the basal gan-
glia: relevance for the understanding 
of addiction. Behav. Brain Res. 199, 
89–102.
Berridge, K. C. (2007). The debate over 
dopamine’s role in reward: the case for 
incentive salience. Psychopharmacology 
(Berl.) 191, 391–431.
Berridge, K. C., and Robinson, T. E. 
(1998). What is the role of dopamine 
in reward: hedonic impact, reward 
learning, or incentive salience? Brain 
Res. Brain Res. Rev. 28, 309–369.
Bilder, R. M., Volavka, J., Lachman, H. M., 
and Grace, A. A. (2004). The catechol-
O-methyltransferase polymorphism: 
relations to the tonic-phasic dopamine 
hypothesis and neuropsychiatric phe-
notypes. Neuropsychopharmacology 
29, 1943–1961.
Boureau, Y. L., and Dayan, P. (2011). 
Opponency revisited: competition and 
cooperation between dopamine and 
serotonin. Neuropsychopharmacology 
36, 74–97.
Buckholtz, J. W., Treadway, M. T., Cowan, 
R. L., Woodward, N. D., Li, R., Ansari, 
M. S., Baldwin, R. M., Schwartzman, 
A. N., Shelby, E. S., Smith, C. E., 
Kessler, R. M., and Zald, D. H. (2010). 
Dopaminergic network differences in 
human impulsivity. Science 329, 532.
Collins, P., Wilkinson, L. S., Everitt, B. 
J., Robbins, T. W., and Roberts, A. C. 
Aarts et al. Dopamine and the motivation–cognition interface
www.frontiersin.org July 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 163 | 9
Robbins, T. W., and Arnsten, A. F. (2009). 
The neuropsychopharmacology of 
fronto-executive function: mono-
aminergic modulation. Annu. Rev. 
Neurosci. 32, 267–287.
Robbins, T. W., and Everitt, B. J. (1992). 
Functions of dopamine in the dorsal 
and ventral striatum. Neurosciences 4, 
119–127.
Robbins, T. W., and Everitt, B. J. (1996). 
Neurobehavioural mechanisms of 
reward and motivation. Curr. Opin. 
Neurobiol. 6, 228–236.
Robbins, T. W., and Everitt, B. J. (2003). 
“Motivation and reward,” in 
Fundamental Neuroscience, eds L. R. 
Squire, F. Bloom, S. McConnellet, J. 
L. Roberts, N. C. Spitzer, and M. J. 
Zigmond (London: Academic Press), 
1109–1126.
Robbins, T. W., and Everitt, B. J. (2007). 
A role for mesencephalic dopamine in 
activation: commentary on Berridge 
(2006). Psychopharmacology (Berl.) 
191, 433–437.
Roberts, A. C., De Salvia, M. A., 
Wilkinson, L. S., Collins, P., Muir, J. 
L., Everitt, B. J., and Robbins, T. W. 
(1994). 6-Hydroxydopamine lesions 
of the prefrontal cortex in monkeys 
enhance performance on an analog 
of the Wisconsin Card Sort Test: 
possible interactions with subcorti-
cal dopamine. J. Neurosci. 14(5 Pt 1), 
2531–2544.
Rogers, R. D., and Monsell, S. (1995). 
Costs of a predictable switch between 
simple cognitive tasks. J. Exp. Psychol. 
Gen. 124, 207–231.
Rowe, G., Hirsh, J. B., and Anderson, A. 
K. (2007). Positive affect increases 
the breadth of attentional selection. 
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 104, 
383–388.
Salamone, J. D., Correa, M., Farrar, A., and 
Mingote, S. M. (2007). Effort-related 
functions of nucleus accumbens 
dopamine and associated forebrain 
circuits. Psychopharmacology (Berl.) 
191, 461–482.
Savine, A. C., Beck, S. M., Edwards, B. G., 
Chiew, K. S., and Braver, T. S. (2010). 
Enhancement of cognitive control by 
approach and avoidance motivational 
states. Cogn. Emot. 24, 338–356.
Savine, A. C., and Braver, T. S. (2010). 
Motivated cognitive control: reward 
incentives modulate preparatory neu-
ral activity during task-switching. J. 
Neurosci. 30, 10294–10305.
Schott, B. H., Seidenbecher, C. I., Fenker, D. 
B., Lauer, C. J., Bunzeck, N., Bernstein, 
H. G., Tischmeyer, W., Gundelfinger, E. 
D., Heinze, H. J., and Duzel, E. (2006). 
The dopaminergic midbrain par-
ticipates in human episodic memory 
formation: evidence from genetic 
imaging. J. Neurosci. 26, 1407–1417.
volunteers. Psychopharmacology (Berl.) 
176, 331–342.
Mogenson, G. J., Jones, D. L., and Yim, C. 
Y. (1980). From motivation to action: 
functional interface between the lim-
bic system and the motor system. Prog. 
Neurobiol. 14, 69–97.
Monchi, O., Petrides, M., Doyon, J., 
Postuma, R. B., Worsley, K., and 
Dagher, A. (2004). Neural bases of set-
shifting deficits in Parkinson’s disease. 
J. Neurosci. 24, 702–710.
Nauta, W. J., Smith, G. P., Faull, R. L., and 
Domesick, V. B. (1978). Efferent con-
nections and nigral afferents of the 
nucleus accumbens septi in the rat. 
Neuroscience 3, 385–401.
O’Sullivan, S. S., Wu, K., Politis, M., 
Lawrence, A. D., Evans, A. H., Bose, 
S. K., Djamshidian, A., Lees, A. J., and 
Piccini, P. (2011). Cue-induced stri-
atal dopamine release in Parkinson’s 
 disease-associated impulsive-com-
pulsive behaviours. Brain 134(Pt 4), 
969–978.
Padmala, S., and Pessoa, L. (2011). Reward 
reduces conflict by enhancing atten-
tional control and biasing visual 
cortical processing. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 
PMID: 21452938. [Epub ahead of 
print].
Parkinson, J. A., Dalley, J. W., Cardinal, R. 
N., Bamford, A., Fehnert, B., Lachenal, 
G., Rudarakanchana, N., Halkerston, 
K. M., Robbins, T. W., and Everitt, B. J. 
(2002). Nucleus accumbens dopamine 
depletion impairs both acquisition and 
performance of appetitive Pavlovian 
approach behaviour: implications for 
mesoaccumbens dopamine function. 
Behav. Brain Res. 137, 149–163.
Passingham, R. E. (1993). The Frontal 
Lobes and Voluntary Action. New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press.
Pecina, S., Berridge, K. C., and Parker, L. 
A. (1997). Pimozide does not shift 
palatability: separation of anhedonia 
from sensorimotor suppression by 
taste reactivity. Pharmacol. Biochem. 
Behav. 58, 801–811.
Pessoa, L. (2009). How do emotion and 
motivation direct executive control? 
Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 13, 
160–166.
Pessoa, L., and Engelmann, J. B. (2010). 
Embedding reward signals into per-
ception and cognition. Front. Neurosci. 
4:17. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2010.00017
Phillips, P. E., Walton, M. E., and Jhou, 
T. C. (2007). Calculating utility: 
preclinical evidence for cost-benefit 
analysis by mesolimbic dopamine. 
Psychopharmacology (Berl.) 191, 
483–495.
Robbins, T. W. (2000). Chemical neuro-
modulation of frontal-executive func-
tions in humans and other animals. 
Exp. Brain Res. 133, 130–138.
Kehagia, A. A., Murray, G. K., and Robbins, 
T. W. (2010). Learning and cognitive 
flexibility: frontostriatal function and 
monoaminergic modulation. Curr. 
Opin. Neurobiol. 20, 199–204.
Knutson, B., and Cooper, J. C. (2005). 
Functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing of reward prediction. Curr. Opin. 
Neurol. 18, 411–417.
Ko, J. H., Monchi, O., Ptito, A., Bloomfield, 
P., Houle, S., and Strafella, A. P. (2008). 
Theta burst stimulation-induced 
inhibition of dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex reveals hemispheric asymmetry 
in striatal dopamine release during a 
set-shifting task: a TMS-[(11)C]raclo-
pride PET study. Eur. J. Neurosci. 28, 
2147–2155.
Konorsky, J. (1967). Integrative Activity 
of the Brain: An Interdisciplinary 
Approach. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Koob, G. F., Riley, S. J., Smith, S. C., and 
Robbins, T. W. (1978). Effects of 
6-hydroxydopamine lesions of the 
nucleus accumbens septi and olfac-
tory tubercle on feeding, locomotor 
activity, and amphetamine anorexia 
in the rat. J. Comp. Physiol. Psychol. 
92, 917–927.
Kouneiher, F., Charron, S., and Koechlin, 
E. (2009). Motivation and cognitive 
control in the human prefrontal cor-
tex. Nat. Neurosci. 12, 939–945.
Krawczyk, D. C., Gazzaley, A., and 
D’Esposito, M. (2007). Reward 
modulation of prefrontal and visual 
association cortex during an incentive 
working memory task. Brain Res. 1141, 
168–177.
Lewis, S., Slabosz, A., Robbins, T. W., 
Barker, R. A., and Owen, A. M. (2005). 
Dopaminergic basis for deficits in 
working memory but not attentional 
set-shifting in Parkinson’s disease. 
Neuropsychologia 43, 823–832.
Lyon, M., and Robbins, T. W. (1975). 
“The action of central nervous sys-
tem drugs: a general theory concern-
ing amphetamine effects,” in Current 
Developments in Psychopharmacology, 
ed. W. Essman (New York: Spectrum 
Publications), 80–163.
Maddox, W. T., and Markman, A. B. 
(2010). The motivation-cognition 
interface in learning and decision-
making. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 19, 
106–110.
Maia, T. V., and Frank, M. J. (2011). From 
reinforcement learning models to psy-
chiatric and neurological disorders. 
Nat. Neurosci. 14, 154–162.
Mehta, M. A., Manes, F. F., Magnolfi, G., 
Sahakian, B. J., and Robbins, T. W. 
(2004). Impaired set-shifting and disso-
ciable effects on tests of spatial working 
memory following the dopamine D2 
receptor antagonist sulpiride in human 
associative cortical connections, pro-
viding a substrate for incentive-based 
learning. J. Neurosci. 26, 8368–8376.
Haber, S. N., and Knutson, B. (2010). 
The reward circuit: linking pri-
mate anatomy and human imaging. 
Neuropsychopharmacology 35, 4–26.
Harsay, H. A., Buitenweg, J. I., Wijnen, J. 
G., Guerreiro, M. J., and Ridderinkhof, 
K. R. (2010). Remedial effects of 
motivational incentive on declin-
ing cognitive control in healthy 
aging and Parkinson’s disease. Front 
Aging Neurosci. 2:144. doi: 10.3389/
fnagi.2010.00144
Haruno, M., and Kawato, M. (2006). 
Heterarchical reinforcement-learning 
model for integration of multiple cor-
tico-striatal loops: fMRI examination 
in stimulus-action-reward association 
learning. Neural Netw. 19, 1242–1254.
Hazy, T. E., Frank, M. J., and O’Reilly, R. 
C. (2006). Banishing the homuncu-
lus: making working memory work. 
Neuroscience 139, 105–118.
Higgins, E. T., Shah, J., and Friedman, R. 
(1997). Emotional responses to goal 
attainment: strength of regulatory 
focus as moderator. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 
72, 515–525.
Ichihara-Takeda, S., and Funahashi, S. 
(2008). Activity of primate orbito-
frontal and dorsolateral prefrontal 
neurons: effect of reward schedule on 
task-related activity. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 
20, 563–579.
Ichihara-Takeda, S., Takeda, K., and 
Funahashi, S. (2010). Reward acts as a 
signal to control delay-period activity 
in delayed-response tasks. Neuroreport 
21, 367–370.
Ikemoto, S. (2007). Dopamine reward cir-
cuitry: two projection systems from 
the ventral midbrain to the nucleus 
accumbens-olfactory tubercle com-
plex. Brain Res. Rev. 56, 27–78.
Ikemoto, S., and Panksepp, J. (1999). The 
role of nucleus accumbens dopamine 
in motivated behavior: a unifying 
interpretation with special reference 
to reward-seeking. Brain Res. Brain 
Res. Rev. 31, 6–41.
Jimura, K., Locke, H. S., and Braver, T. S. 
(2010). Prefrontal cortex mediation 
of cognitive enhancement in reward-
ing motivational contexts. Proc. Natl. 
Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 107, 8871–8876.
Kawagoe, R., Takikawa, Y., and Hikosaka, 
O. (1998). Expectation of reward 
modulates cognitive signals in 
the basal ganglia. Nat. Neurosci. 1, 
411–416.
Kawagoe, R., Takikawa, Y., and Hikosaka, 
O. (2004). Reward-predicting activity 
of dopamine and caudate neurons – a 
possible mechanism of motivational 
control of saccadic eye movement. J. 
Neurophysiol. 91, 1013–1024.
Aarts et al. Dopamine and the motivation–cognition interface
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition  July 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 163 | 10
cue-triggered “wanting” for sucrose 
reward. J. Neurosci. 21, 7831–7840.
Yerkes, R. M., and Dodson, J. D. (1908). 
The relation of the strength of stimu-
lus to the rapidity of habit formation. 
J. Comp. Neurol. 18, 459–482.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The 
authors declare that the research was 
conducted in the absence of any com-
mercial or financial relationships that 
could be construed as a potential conflict 
of interest.
Received: 01 March 2011; paper pending 
published: 21 April 2011; accepted: 30 June 
2011; published online: 14 July 2011.
Citation: Aarts E, van Holstein M and 
Cools R (2011) Striatal dopamine and the 
interface between motivation and cogni-
tion. Front. Psychology 2:163. doi: 10.3389/
fpsyg.2011.00163
This article was submitted to Frontiers 
in Cognition, a specialty of Frontiers in 
Psychology.
Copyright © 2011 Aarts, van Holstein and 
Cools. This is an open-access article sub-
ject to a non-exclusive license between the 
authors and Frontiers Media SA, which per-
mits use, distribution and reproduction in 
other forums, provided the original authors 
and source are credited and other Frontiers 
conditions are complied with.
conflict-driven control. Psychol. Sci. 
21, 1629–1634.
van Wouwe, N. C., Band, G. P., and 
Ridderinkhof, K. R. (2011). Positive 
affect modulates flexibility and eval-
uative control. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 23, 
524–539.
Volkow, N., Fowler, J. S., Wang, G. J., Baler, 
R., and Telang, F. (2009). Imaging dopa-
mine’s role in drug abuse and addiction. 
Neuropharmacology 56(Suppl. 1), 3–8.
Wallis, J. D., and Kennerley, S. W. (2010). 
Heterogeneous reward signals in pre-
frontal cortex. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 
20, 191–198.
Wittmann, B. C., Schott, B. H., Guderian, 
S., Frey, J. U., Heinze, H. J., and Duzel, 
E. (2005). Reward-related FMRI 
activation of dopaminergic mid-
brain is associated with enhanced 
 hippocampus-dependent long-term 
memory formation. Neuron 45, 
459–467.
Wyvell, C. L., and Berridge, K. C. (2000). 
Intra-accumbens amphetamine 
increases the conditioned incentive 
salience of sucrose reward: enhance-
ment of reward “wanting” without 
enhanced “liking” or response rein-
forcement. J. Neurosci. 20, 8122–8130.
Wyvell, C. L., and Berridge, K. C. (2001). 
Incentive sensitization by previous 
amphetamine exposure: increased 
Strafella, A. P., Paus, T., Fraraccio, M., and 
Dagher, A. (2003). Striatal dopamine 
release induced by repetitive tran-
scranial magnetic stimulation of the 
human motor cortex. Brain 126(Pt 
12), 2609–2615.
Taylor, J. R., and Robbins, T. W. (1984). 
Enhanced behavioural control by 
conditioned reinforcers follow-
ing microinjections of d-ampheta-
mine into the nucleus accumbens. 
Psychopharmacology (Berl.) 84, 
405–412.
Tobler, P. N., Fiorillo, C. D., and Schultz, 
W. (2005). Adaptive coding of reward 
value by dopamine neurons. Science 
307, 1642–1645.
van Holstein, M., Aarts, E., van der 
Schaaf, M. E., Geurts, D. E., Verkes, 
R. J., Franke, B., van Schouwenburg, 
M. R., and Cools, R. (2011). Human 
cognitive flexibility depends on 
dopamine D2 receptor signaling. 
Psychopharmacology (Berl.). PMID: 
21611724. [Epub ahead of print].
van Steenbergen, H., Band, G. P., and 
Hommel, B. (2009). Reward counter-
acts conflict adaptation: evidence for 
a role of affect in executive control. 
Psychol. Sci. 20, 1473–1477.
van Steenbergen, H., Band, G. P., and 
Hommel, B. (2010). In the mood 
for adaptation: how affect regulates 
Schultz, W. (2002). Getting formal with 
dopamine and reward. Neuron 36, 
241–263.
Shohamy, D., and Adcock, R. A. (2010). 
Dopamine and adaptive memory. 
Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 14, 
464–472.
Slabosz, A., Lewis, S. J., Smigasiewicz, K., 
Szymura, B., Barker, R. A., and Owen, 
A. M. (2006). The role of learned 
irrelevance in attentional set-shifting 
impairments in Parkinson’s disease. 
Neuropsychology 20, 578–588.
Steeves, T. D., Miyasaki, J., Zurowski, 
M., Lang, A. E., Pellecchia, G., Van 
Eimeren, T., Rusjan, P., Houle, S., and 
Strafella, A. P. (2009). Increased stri-
atal dopamine release in Parkinsonian 
patients with pathological gambling: 
a [11C] raclopride PET study. Brain 
132(Pt 5), 1376–1385.
Strafella, A. P., Ko, J. H., Grant, J., 
Fraraccio, M., and Monchi, O. (2005). 
Corticostriatal functional interactions 
in Parkinson’s disease: a rTMS/[11C]
raclopride PET study. Eur. J. Neurosci. 
22, 2946–2952.
Strafella, A. P., Paus, T., Barrett, J., and 
Dagher, A. (2001). Repetitive tran-
scranial magnetic stimulation of the 
human prefrontal cortex induces 
dopamine release in the caudate 
nucleus. J. Neurosci. 21, RC157.
Aarts et al. Dopamine and the motivation–cognition interface
www.frontiersin.org July 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 163 | 11
